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Introduction
When the New Order regime came to an end in 1998 after more than three decades 
of authoritarian rule, Indonesia entered the reformasi era, and a transition toward a 
democratic system began in earnest. The new turn in the political scene soon led to a 
wealth of history projects revisiting the country's past in order to steer its way into 
"new futures." In a fashion that parallels "truth-seeking" investigations in other 
transitional societies, these endeavors commonly uncovered aspects of Indonesia's 
national past that had been tightly censored or prohibited as material for public 
discussions during the New Order years. Consequently, such topics as communism, 
political violence, ethnic and religious conflict, and corruption began to take the center
1 An earlier draft of finis article was presented at the Joint Conference on Southeast Asian Studies, "Ten 
Years After: Reformasi and New Social Movements in Indonesia, 1998-2008," held at the University of 
California at Berkeley, Apri I 25-26, 2008, and organized by the UC Berkeley Center for Southeast Asia 
Studies. I am thankful to the organizing committee for providing me with the opportunity to present my 
work. I would also like to extend a special word of thanks to Robin Gold. Finally, I gratefully acknowledge 
the ii nancial support I recei ved from the University of Macau Start-up Research Fund to complete this 
work.
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stage of intellectual pursuits.2 The new intellectual climate in the post-New Order 
Indonesia has also shed light on the role of personal memory as a "touchstone for new 
histories," as victims of violence and suppression slowly began to tell their stories.3 
One individual who has been placed under the spotlight in the transitional Indonesia is 
Sumarsono (b. 1921), one of the few surviving eyewitnesses of Peristiwa Madiun, or the 
Madiun Affair, who discussed his view of the incident on several occasions between 
1949 and 2008. A critical turning point in the last years of the Indonesian Revolution 
(1945-1949), this armed conflict between Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI, Indonesian 
Communist Party) and the Republican government reportedly took the lives of 
thousands during the guerrilla warfare that lasted from September to December 1948. 
This article examines and evaluates Sumarsono's accounts of Madiun by comparing 
and contrasting them with the accepted renditions, and by doing so, fleshes out 
historical references to this important highlight in modern Indonesian history that is 
often overshadowed by the "politicide" of Communists and Communist sympathizers 
that took place in 1965 and 1966.
The Course of Events
What is known today as the "Madiun Affair," or Peristiwa Madiun, was an armed 
conflict between the government of the Republic of Indonesia and the left-wing 
opposition group, Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR, People's Democratic Front). In the 
course of the three-month confrontation, intermittent fighting plagued much of Central 
and East Java.4 Although the exact number of casualties is unknown, the Madiun 
conflict is reported to have claimed thousands of lives and brought devastation and 
violence to the affected regions.
The initial stage of the conflict began at dawn on September 18, 1948, in the city of 
Madiun in East Java. A minor clash between the government troops and FDR members 
broke out and ended with the disarming of the former by the latter. On the next day, 
the triumphant FDR proceeded to set up the National Front Government to bring order 
to the city and the surrounding areas. The central government, fearful of the possible 
disintegration of the young Indonesian Republic, responded immediately by launching 
a military campaign to seize Madiun, which was in the hands of a force the 
government leaders deemed "the rebels." The Siliwangi division of Tentara Nasional 
Indonesia (TNI, Indonesian National Army) and Corps Polisi Militer (CPM, Military 
Police Corps) spearheaded the operation, and swiftly recaptured the city on September 
30. Members of the FDR in Madiun, meanwhile, fled the city just in time to avoid 
confrontation with the government forces and headed west to the Dutch territory to
2 Mary S. Zurbuchen, ed., Beginning to Remember: The Past in the Indonesian Present (Seattle, WA: University 
of Washington Press, 2005). See especially the introduction, "Historical Memory in Contemporary 
Indonesia," by Zurbuchen, pp. 3-32. For case studies on Vietnam, see Hue-Tarn Ho Tai, ed., The Country of 
Memory: Remaking the Past in Late Socialist Vietnam (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2001).
3 Zurbuchen, ed., Beginning to Remember, p. 6.
4 At the time of the Madiun Affair, Java was divided into areas under Republican control and those under 
Dutch occupation. The Republican territory was concentrated in Central and East Java and Bantam, with 
its provisional capital located in Yogyakarta. The Netherlands held the western half of the island 
(excluding Bantam) and the far eastern region, including Madura. The demarcation line had been 
established under the Renville Agreement.
Remembering and Forgetting Indonesia's Madiun Affair 2 1
escape persecution by the Indonesian government. Having recovered Madiun, the 
government concentrated its effort on hunting down FDR leaders and supporters, who 
by then were roaming at large across the Republican territory and waging guerrilla 
warfare in resistance and in the slim hope of gaining popular support for their cause. 
The military operation continued well into November, during which time skirmishes 
were rampant and disrupted the lives of those in the affected areas. Although it is 
difficult to determine when the Madiun Affair actually ended, by December most FDR 
leaders had either been killed during the guerrilla warfare or captured and executed by 
the Indonesian government.5 By that time, the FDR was in shambles, without 
leadership, and had lost its stature as an organized opposition.
The Historiography of the Madiun Affair
The historiography of the Madiun Affair is deeply political. From the onset, party 
politics and the political inclinations of narrators played a seminal role in determining 
how the bloodshed that reportedly killed thousands was both remembered and 
forgotten. The earliest references to the event typically consisted of immediate 
reactions to its outbreak on September 18, 1948. In their radio speeches, political and 
military leaders of major organizations took their stands firmly and, in so doing, 
sought to garner support from the public for their causes. For instance, on September 
19, 1948, Sukarno (1901-70), the first president of Indonesia, delivered a speech, later 
published as "Kepada Bangsaku" (To My People), in which he resolutely called for unity 
among Indonesians to defend the independence of the nascent Indonesian Republic, 
now under threat from the PKI rebellion.6 In response, Musso, the PKI chairperson and 
a leader of the left-wing coalition, FDR, who had recently returned to Java from 
Moscow, praised the turn of events in Madiun as an effort by the Indonesian people to 
establish a popular sovereign state free of imperialism and "bourgeois" rule.7 
Consequently, the speeches by political leaders combined with the contemporaneous 
reports in the daily newspapers shaped the binary view of the Madiun Affair as a 
conflict between "nationalists" and "Communists."
Following the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands in 1950, Indonesia 
formed a new government under Sukarno. In the early years of his postrevolution 
presidency (1950-65), Indonesia was increasingly entangled with the global Cold War 
conflict, and the ideological divide between the political left and right, as well as 
between Communism and Islam, grew deeper. Situated firmly in the context of Cold 
War politics, a corpus of literature stressed that the Madiun Affair was a disastrous 
consequence of bahaya merah (red peril, red menace), and the phrase, bahaya merah, 
recurred frequently in government documents, as well as publications by Islamic
5 Musso, the Soviet-trained ideologue and the de facto leader of the FDR/ PKI from August 1948 until his 
death that same year, was reportedly killed by a gunshot near Ponorogo on October 31. Other FDR leaders, 
such as Amir Sjarifuddin and Suripno, were captured on December 1 near the Renville truce line and were 
executed, along with nine others, in Yogyakarta on December 19,1948.
6 Sukarno, Kepada Bangsaku (fakarta: Panitia Pembina Djiwa Revolusi, 1962). For the English translation of 
the speech, see Ann Swift, The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1989), pp. 97-99.
7 The transcript of Musso's speech is included in George McTurnan Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in 
Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 293-94. See also Swift, Road to Madiun, pp. 101-2.
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groups, through the 1950s and beyond.8 A handful of short stories published in the 
early 1950s by Indonesian authors have also explored the theme of the growing 
"Communist threat" and the ideological rift between Islam and Communism, conflicts 
portrayed as important factors in fomenting social and political undercurrents of 
turmoil and violence.9
Sukarno's presidency was also marked by "democratic" experiments with 
pluralism in national and local politics, an approach that his eclectic ideology of 
Nasakom (Nationalism, Religion, and Communism) encapsulated. Reflecting these 
political currents, the PKI, reorganized under the leadership of the new chairperson, D. 
N. Aidit (1923-1965), gained influence in central government and enjoyed popular 
support. Until the mass killings of purported communists in 1965 to 1966 and the 
suppression of communism in Indonesia, the PKI endeavored to confront the official 
statement about its alleged role in staging Madiun by publishing a White Paper, as 
well as staging public appearances and speeches by the party leaders.10 Aidit, for 
instance, repeatedly attacked the military policies of the coalition government led by 
Mohammad Hatta (1902-80) and maintained that they were aimed at purging leftist 
influences in the national army. The PKI's story line stresses that the Madiun Affair 
was actually a "provocation" organized by the Hatta government.11 Similarly, the 
Soviet press reported that the Madiun Affair was a "provocation" against leftists 
orchestrated by the Sukarno-Hatta government, and it welcomed the move by the
8 See, for instance, M. Isa Anshary et at, Bahaja: Merah di Indonesia (Bandung: Front Anti Komunis, 1955); 
Departemen Luar Negeri, Fakta dan Dokumenl untuk Menjusun Baku "Indonesia Memasuki Gelanggang 
Internasional" (Takarta: Kementerian Luar Negeri, Direktorat V, Seksi Penjelidikan dan Dokumentasi/ 
Perpustakaan, 1958-1959); and Mohammad Sofwanhadi, Bahaja Merah: Kutipan dari Tadjuk Surat Kabar 
Surat Rakjat (Surabaya: Surat Rakjat, 1960).
9 For example, Pramoedya Ananta Toer's "Dia jang Menjerah" (Acceptance), published originally in 1950, 
narrates the survival of a family whose life was disrupted by the turbulent years of the Japanese 
Occupation, the return of Dutch forces, and the Madiun Affair. The story revolves around the personal 
struggles of main characters as they join the Red army around the time of the Madiun conflict, but 
eventually return home, disillusioned, and withdraw into an apolitical life. S. Rukiah Kertapati's 
"Kedjatuhan dan Hati" (An Affair of the Heart), which also came out in 1950, showcases hopes and then 
disillusionment with Communism. While working for the army as a nurse, the female protagonist falls in 
love with a rebel and an avid Communist with whom she has a son. His idealism and political zeal wear 
her out and cause her to return home. Parting ways with the activist father of her child, she settles down 
with a mundane and faithful neighbor in her home village. The English translations of these short stories 
are in John McGlynn and William H. Frederick, trans., Reflections on Rebellion: Stories from the Indonesian 
Upheavals o f 1948 and 1965 (Athens, OH: Ohio University Center for International Studies, 1983), pp. 49- 
105. Another example is Matu Mona's undated work, Peristiwa demi Peristiwa (Medan: Pustaka Anugrah, 
19—?). Set in the midst of guerrilla warfare following the fall of Madiun, the story features the frustrated 
love affair between Satryo, a devout Muslim and Hizbullah soldier, and Tarminah, the progressive leftist 
and Marxist.
10 The first of such endeavors was Partai Komunis Indonesia, Comite Central, Baku Putih tentang Peristiwa 
Madiun (Jakarta: Sekretariat Agitasi-Propaganda C.C. P.K.I., 1951). Aiming to document evidence, the 
booklet is a collection of relevant newspaper articles and photos that chronicle highlights of political and 
military affairs leading up to and following the Madiun Affair in 1948. Subsequent PKI publications were 
more vocal in confronting the official statement about the party's alleged role in staging the event and 
triggering the rebellion.
11 D. N. Aidit, Konfrontasi Peristiwa Madiun 1948 Peristiwa Sumatera 1956 (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1957), 
preface, n. p.; D. N. Aidit, Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa Madiun. Pembelaan D .N. Aidit dimuka Pengadilan Negeri 
Djakarta, tgl. 24 Februari 1955, 4th ed. (Jakarta: Jajasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp. 17-32.
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leftists to launch the armed struggle for independence rather than complying with the 
diplomatic path taken by the government.12
In 1966, Sukarno's "Old" Order was replaced by what became known as the New 
Order, and in the following year, Suharto (1921-2008) was declared the second 
president of Indonesia. Widespread violence preceded the regime change. In an armed 
conflict on September 30, 1965, known popularly as "Gestapu" or "G30S" (Gerakan 
Tiga Puluh September, 30th September Movement), General Suharto and his aides 
seized control of the government after suppressing a coup attempt by military officers 
with alleged links to the PKI. Violence escalated in the following months, as purges 
and mass slaughters of Communists and Communist sympathizers intensified across 
the country, especially in Java and Bali. During the bloodshed, PKI's national leaders, 
including Aidit, were captured and killed, and the party and its mass organizations 
were banned in March 1966.
The inception of the New Order coincided with the publication of two new 
additions to the study of the Madiun Affair. Although the politicide of the PKI and 
Communists was still fresh in the public's memory, H. A. Notosoetardjo's Peristiwa 
Madiun Tragedi Nasional and Djamal Marsudi's Menjingkap Tabir Fakta-fakta 
Pembrontakan PKI dalam Peristiwa Madiun made an explicit connection between Madiun 
and G30S, calling the latter "the second PKI rebellion," and focused on collecting 
"fakta-fakta" (facts) about Madiun to bring about a deeper understanding of G30S.13 
Meanwhile, the New Order regime tightened its rein on the national past through a 
series of official investigations into the Madiun Affair. As early as 1966, Suharto 
endorsed Pinardi's Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I. 18 September 1948 di Madiun as a 
serious effort to reexamine " lembaran hitam" (black pages) in the history of the 
Indonesian Revolution.14
The history writing regarding Madiun carried out under the auspices of the New 
Order also made extensive use of personal accounts by those military officers who took 
part in the military operation against the FDR/PKI forces in Central and East Java from 
late September to mid-December 1948. Firmly anti-Communist and patriotic in 
character, the officers' recollections vividly narrated traumatic experiences during the 
campaign and their own lasting pride in their contribution to defeating the Communist 
forces in Madiun and protecting the Indonesian nation from dissolution.15 Personal
12 Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 
1957), p. 74.
13 H. A. Notosoetardjo, Peristiwa Madiun Tragedi Nasional (Jakarta: Endang, Pemuda, Api Islam, 1966), p. 9; 
Djamal Marsudi, Menjingkap Tabir Fakta-fakta Pemberontakan PKI dalam Peristiwa Madiun (Jakarta: Merdeka 
Press, 1966).
14 Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I. September 1948 di Madiun (Jakarta: Inkopak-Hazera, 1966), p. vii. 
This work deserves mention not only because it was one of the first official publications on Madiun to 
come out in New Order Indonesia, but also because it treated the mounting tension in Madiun as a 
decisive factor in setting the stage for the military showdown. Pinardi suggests, in a close parallel to 
Sumarsono's own explanation, that the chaos in Madiun, in addition to the defeat of the FDR troops in 
Solo, prompted Sumarsono to resort to an armed action in order to prevent Madiun from becoming a 
second Solo (pp. 77-79).
15 A few examples of monographs dedicated to chronicling military operations that took place from 
September through December 1948 include the following: Moela Marboen, Gerakan Operasi Militer I Untuk 
Menumpas Peristiwa Madiun (Jakarta: Mega Bookstore, 1965); A. H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol. 
2 (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968-71); Nasution, Pemberontakan PKI 1948, vol. 8 of Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan
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narratives of the Madiun Affair were not limited to those authored by prominent 
officers and political leaders. Marking the fortieth commemoration of the killings 
allegedly committed by the PKI, Lubang-Lubang Pembantaian revisited the "national 
tragedy" through eyewitness accounts—many by villagers—of violence and the 
endemic plunder and robbery in the countryside.16
At the same time that the current affairs in Indonesian politics were leaving a 
decisive mark on the interpretation of the Madiun Affair, foreign researchers were 
making references to the event in their respective projects and, in so doing, they 
pursued queries and themes similar to those featured in the aforementioned works. 
Several researchers placed their studies in the loosely binary context of the mounting 
opposition between leftists and nationalists, as well as the opposition between 
nationalism and communism. As Anthony Reid shows, the dismantling of the leftist 
groups in late 1948 led to a crucial conceptual break, and the revolution thereafter 
became increasingly "national" rather than "social."17 Some non-Indonesian authors 
interpreted events from a point of view often discredited in New Order publications. 
Having reviewed the previously classified documents in the State Archives in The 
Hague, Rudi Kreutzer asserted that the Hatta government, overall, deserved to be held 
responsible for curtailing the political and military influence of the Indonesian left, 
executing Indonesia's "best revolutionaries," and ultimately averting a full-blown 
social revolution.18 Nonetheless, the analytical and conceptual jargon, grounded in 
such terms as "leftist," "nationalist," "communist," and "socialist," presents its own 
limitations. In his in-depth study of the leftist movements in the 1930s and 1940s, Soe 
Hok Gie illuminates the intricate divisions within the political left and points out that 
these groupings and internal factions were not necessarily a product of doctrinal 
differences, but rather reflected personal connections and alliances.19 Meanwhile, 
Western sociologists and anthropologists writing in the 1960s and 1970s explored 
issues related to the ideological schism between Islam and Communism through 
structural analysis of violence in Central and East Java during the guerrilla warfare. 
Building on their field studies and interviews with eyewitnesses conducted in the 
1950s and 1960s, Robert Jay and Margot L. Lyon proposed that a root cause of the
Indonesia (Bandung: Disjarah-AD dan Angkasa, 1979); and Himawan Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, 
"Rebut Kembali Madiun . . Siliwangi Menumpas Pemberontakan PKI/Moeso 1948 (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar 
Harapan, 1994).
16 Maksum, Agus Sunyoto, and A. Zainuddin, eds., Lubang-Lubang Pembantaian: Petualangan PKI di Madiun 
(Jakarta: Grafiti, 1990). This is a collection of twenty-seven eyewitness accounts dedicated to the memories 
of those victims who had perished in the titular "slaughter holes." They were published originally in Jazva 
Pos between September 18,1989, and October 16,1989.
17 Anthony Reid, The Indonesian National Revolution 1945-1950 (Hawthorn, Victoria: Longman, 1974), pp. 
146-47.
18 Rudi Kreutzer, The Madiun Affair: Hatta's Betrayal o f Indonesia's First Social Revolution (Queensland, 
Australia: James Cook University of North Queensland, South East Asian Studies Committee, 1981), pp. 35, 
39. Kreutzer draws his observations from the primary documents located at the State Archives in The 
Hague, and from interviews with a few eyewitnesses.
19 Soe Hok Gie, Orang-orang di Persimpangan Kirijalan: Kisah Pemberontakan Madiun September 1948 
(Yogyakarta: Yayasan Bentang Budaya, 1997). The book was written originally as an MA thesis submitted 
to the Faculty of Literature, University of Indonesia, in 1969.
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bloodshed at the local level lay in the hostility between the two opposing cultural and 
religious groups, santri (orthodox Muslims) and abangan (syncretic traditionalists).20
Anticipation of a new intellectual climate and a reinterpretation of the Madiun 
Affair from fresh perspectives ran high when the New Order regime ended its three 
decades of authoritarian rule in 1998 and a transition toward democratic reforms began 
in earnest. The regime change soon fueled the resurgence of a counter narrative about 
Madiun. Aiming to set the record straight in accord with the PKI's standpoint, some 
new publications openly attempted to redress the situation and argued for the first 
time since the mid-1960s that the PKI was innocent in triggering the bloodshed of 1948. 
They declared that the purported uprising was a provocation staged by Hatta's 
government to drive out the leftist units in the military.21 While the previously silenced 
voice of the left was making a return "with vengeance," patriotic sentiment continued 
to inspire Indonesian researchers to undertake new investigations and remember the 
Madiun Affair as an unforgettable episode in the collective memory of the Indonesian 
people.22 In 2005, marking the sixtieth anniversary of Indonesian independence, 
Himawan Soetanto, a military historian and a former lieutenant general who had lived 
through the turbulent months of 1948 in his youth, revisited the topic in his doctoral 
dissertation and set out to write a "complete history" of Madiun "in an objective 
manner" rather than a chronicle of personal experience and emotional struggle.23 His 
research resulted in a monograph, Madiun dari Republik ke Republik, which documented 
scrupulously the course of military operations by government troops as well as 
highlights in international and domestic politics.
The growing tendency to acknowledge multiple voices from Indonesia's national 
past brought attention to the "leftist" individuals whose political careers had been 
rarely discussed in public during the New Order years. Sumarsono, a principal actor in 
the Madiun Affair and one of the few surviving eyewitnesses of the incident, is one 
such individual. Until recently, the existing scholarship made only limited references 
to his part in the conflict.24 This neglect has since been redressed. One recent project 
that explored Sumarsono's view of the Madiun Affair consisted of interviews 
conducted by Kusalah Subagiyo Tur in 1998 and 2000.25 Together, these interviews
20 Robert R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven, CT: Southeast Asia Studies, Yale 
University, 1963), pp. 26-28; Margot L. Lyon, Bases o f Conflict in Rural Java (Berkeley, CA: Center for South 
and Southeast Asia Studies, University of California, 1970).
21 D. N. Aidit et at, PKI Korban Perang Dingin: Sejarah Peristiwa Madiun 1948 (Jakarta: ERA Publisher, 2001); 
and Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbagai Fakta dan Kesaksian sekitar "Peristiwa Madiun" (Jakarta: Pustaka Pena, 
2001).
22 Zurbuchen, Beginning to Remember, p. 13.
23 Himawan Soetanto, Madiun dari Republik ke Republik: Aspek Militer Pemberontakan PKI di Madiun (Jakarta: 
Kata, 2006), pp. ix, xv.
24 Most studies have associated Sumarsono with the youth movement in Surabaya during the early 
months of the Indonesian Revolution (1945-49). Others have simply introduced him as a member of 
Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo, Indonesian Socialist Youth) or mentioned in passing his triumphant 
radio speech on September 19, announcing the formation of the FDR government in Madiun. See, for 
instance, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 290; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 142; and Arnold 
Brackman, Indonesian Communism: A History (New York: Praeger, 1963), p. 91.
25 Sumarsono, "Wawancara dengan Sumarsono (Saksi Utama "Peristiwa Madiun)—Pewawancara:
Kusalah Subagyo Tur," in Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbagai Fakta dan Kesaksian sekitar "Peristiwa Madiun" 
(Jakarta: Pustaka Pena, 2001), pp. 79-106. Kusalah is the brother of the renowned Indonesian novelist, 
Pramoedya Ananta Toer (1925-2006). A full English translation of the interviews can be found in Akiko
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constituted a chapter in Berbagai Fakta dan Kesaksian sekitar "Peristiwa Madiun," a post- 
New Order collective memoir offered through the firsthand accounts of those who 
"directly" experienced the affair.26 Another recent publication is Hersri Setiawan's 
Negara Madiun? Kesaksian Soemarsono Pelaku Perjuangan (Madiun State? Testimony by 
Soemarsono, an Agent of Struggle).27 This biographical study also derives the bulk of 
its information from extensive interviews the author conducted with Sumarsono. What 
is little known is that Sumarsono also produced another document, "De Madioen 
Affaire" (The Madiun Affair), in 1949, during his detention by Dutch forces. This 
Dutch interrogation report chronicles the origins and timeline of the event and his life 
until his capture in October 1949.28 This report, together with Sumarsono's recent 
communication with me and other interviews he has given, constitutes the most 
extensive source of information by an eyewitness describing the Madiun Affair.29 
Although other individuals reminisced about their experiences in the Madiun Affair, 
most of these narratives are rather fragmentary compared with those of Sumarsono.30 
Moreover, Sumarsono's stories are perhaps the only surviving eyewitness accounts of 
the event that were offered by a principal actor in the incident because most leading
Sugiyama, "Indonesia's Madiun Affair of 1948: Two Accounts by Sumarsono" (MA thesis, Ohio 
University, 2002).
26 Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbai Fakta dan Kesaksian, p. iii.
27 Hersri Setiawan, Negara Madiun? Kesaksian Soemarsono Pelaku Perjuangan (Jakarta: Forum Studi 
Perubahan dan Peradaban, 2002).
28 Algemeen Rijksarchief, Procureur-Generaal bij het Hooggerechtshof in Nederlands-Indie 1945-1950, nr. 
979, Jakarta, November 11,1949, unpublished document. I am grateful to Dr. William H. Frederick for 
introducing me to this document and patiently supervising my MA thesis. Full English translation of "De 
Madioen Affaire" is in Sugiyama, "Indonesia's Madiun Affair of 1948." According to Sumarsono, there 
were two Dutch interrogators present when he typed out his testimony (personal communication with 
Sumarsono June 2-3, 2008). "De Madioen Affaire" is one of the four documents included in the dossier nr. 
979, which appears to be a personal file on Sumarsono compiled by the attorney-general of the 
Netherlands Indies. Besides "De Madioen Affaire," the file contains a set of Indonesian and Dutch police 
reports dated October 26,1948, on the general situation surrounding the Madiun Affair and a confidential 
Indonesian report dated November 3,1949, concerning Sumarsono's involvement in the incident.
291 conducted interviews with Sumarsono at his home in Bintaro Jaya, Jakarta, on June 2-3, 2008. The 
author would like to thank Pak Sumarsono and his family for welcoming me on short notice and sharing 
their stories with me. My gratitude also goes to Vannessa Hearman at the University of Melbourne for 
providing me with contact information in a timely way. Another recent attempt to revisit the Madiun 
Affair, which was marked by particular interest in Sumarsono's eyewitness accounts, was the seminar 
"Sarasehan Madiun 1948," held October 19-20, 2002, in Diemen, Holland. At the seminar, Sumarsono 
shared his view of the event with dozens of Indonesians based in Europe, as well as Dutch journalists. 
Ibrahim Isa, a renowned journalist who was present at the meeting, reported on the highlights of the 
discussions in "Akhiri Fitnah dan Pemalsuan Mengenai Peristiwa Madiun 1948," available from 
www.polarhome.com/ pipermail / nasional-a/ 2002-October/ 000051.html and www.polarhome.com/ 
pipermail/nasional-a/2002-October/000052.html (accessed April 10, 2008). See also Harsutejo, Soemarsono: 
Pemimpin Perlawanan Rakyat Surabaya 1945 yang Dilupakan (Jakarta: Sinar Harapan, 2010).
30 For instance, Kemal Idris, a former TNI officer who joined the military campaign to suppress the 
Madiun Affair, discussed his views of the event on several occasions. His accounts appear in Pinardi, 
Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I., pp. 113-17; Maksum and Zainuddin, Lubang-Lubang Pembantaian, pp. 160- 
66; MEMOAR: Senarai Kiprah Sejarah Diangkat dari Majalah TEMPO, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 
1993), pp. 7-10; and Kemal Idris, Kemal Idris: Bertarung dalam Revolusi (Jakarta: Pustaka Sinar Harapan, 
1996), pp. 90-98. Political leaders have also discussed the Madiun Affair in different settings over the years. 
Their stories range from immediate reactions to reminiscences about the event recorded long after the fact, 
and their narratives often relate to their own political careers. These figures include the first president, 
Sukarno; the first vice president, Mohammad Hatta; an accomplished doctor and politician, Abu Hanifah; 
and Suharto, who became the second president of Indonesia in 1967.
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members of the Communist Party were either killed during the guerrilla warfare or 
captured and executed in December 1948.
In the following sections, I examine multiple intersections between Sumarsono's 
personal experience and broader social and political circumstances. His upbringing 
and early political career established him as one of a generation of pemuda, loosely 
translated as "young man," committed to the social and political causes of the 
Indonesian Revolution.31 At the same time, a close reading of Sumarsono's accounts 
illuminate complex and incongruous relations between official statements and 
personal narratives pertaining to Madiun and efforts to assign responsibility for the 
outbreak.32 Throughout the years, he maintained that on the eve of the bloodshed, he 
had received instructions from the PKI leaders to launch a military offensive against 
rival troops in Madiun. His denial that he had taken the lead in initiating the armed 
action presents peculiar discrepancies with most renditions, which generally suggest 
that Sumarsono and his armed comrades had acted on their own. Thus, according to 
the typical narrative, the PKI leaders were caught "off guard" by the sudden turn of 
events in Madiun.33 When read against one another, Sumarsono's accounts exhibit 
shared features of "survivor's memory" and offer a perspective unique to an 
individual who experienced the event and had a chance to talk about it after time had 
passed.34 Recorded just a year after the Madiun conflict, his 1949 statement offers the 
most exhaustive description of the course of events, including the ebb and flow of 
political and military groups in the Madiun area. In contrast, the later accounts by 
Sumarsono discuss retrospectively the cause and consequences of the Madiun Affair 
(and the Indonesian Revolution) in a broader context of twentieth-century world 
politics and economy.
Sumarsono's Upbringing and Early Political Career
Sumarsono was born in 1921 in Kutarjo, Kedu Residency, in Central Java. His 
father, Setjodiwirjo, was an official vaccinator, and his mother, Toekinah, was from a 
modest social background and illiterate.35 After the death of Sumarsono's father in 
1935, his mother became a devout Christian. His mother and his three older sisters, 
who were also baptized and later married Christians, played an influential role in 
bringing Christian life to young Sumarsono.36 He received a primary education in 
Dutch. After attending a missionary secondary school at Kutarjo in 1935, he went to
31 For further discussion on the definition of pemuda, see Benedict R. O'G. Anderson, Jani in a Time of 
Revolution: Occupation and Resistance 1944 -^1946 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972); and William H. 
Frederick, Visions and Heat: The Making of the Indonesian Revolution (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 
1989), pp. 69,151-52.
32 In this article, "personal narratives" is defined broadly and used as an umbrella term for wide-ranging 
material, including published biography or autobiography, records of oral storytelling, letters, and diaries. 
Roxana Waterson, ed., Southeast Asian Lives: Personal Narratives and Historical Experience (Singapore: NUS 
Press, 2007), pp. 3-4.
33 See, for instance, Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 290; Reid, Indonesian National 
Revolution, p. 142; and Swift, Road to Madiun, p. 90.
34 James E. Young, "Between History and Memory: The Uncanny Voices of Historian and Survivor,"
History & Memory 9 ,1-2 (Fall, 1997): 47-58.
35 Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 206.
36 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 10; and Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 206.
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Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (MULO, the Dutch intermediate school), at 
Purworedjo, from 1936 to 1938.37 He moved to Semarang in 1938, where he attended a 
Dutch-language vocational school. Hoping to obtain a position in government or 
business, Sumarsono moved to Jakarta in 1939 and received training in English, 
bookkeeping, and stenotyping. In 1940, he started to work for Borsumij, a well-known 
Dutch corporation, as a clerk and typist, and stayed there until 1942. Throughout the 
Japanese Occupation (1942-45) he worked for various companies in Jakarta and 
Surabaya.38
During his sojourn in Jakarta, Sumarsono acquainted himself with political 
activism and began to study the political ideas of visionary intellectuals of the time, 
including Sukarno, Mohammad Hatta, Sutan Sjahrir, and some European scholars.39 
Their call for justice and an end to colonialism drove young Sumarsono to join the 
"orang orang yang menentang ipenjajahan” (anticolonialists) and support their causes.40 
From 1938 to 1939, he attended a discussion group organized by Amir Sjarifuddin and 
Sanusi Pane. At these seminars, Sumarsono first heard Sjarifuddin, then the chairman 
of Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerindo, Indonesian People's Movement), speak of 
resistance to colonialism and fascism in support of democracy. Sumarsono soon 
became involved in the antifascist movement and joined the Gerindo. In 1944, he 
became a cadre member of Sutan Sjahrir's group and took part in underground 
agitation against the Japanese.41
Toward the end of the Japanese Occupation, Sumarsono married the daughter of a 
Christian clergyman from Kudus, Central Java, and moved to Surabaya to work for the 
Batavia Petroleum Company. Sumarsono's political career continued to blossom in 
Surabaya. He continued to commit himself to the resistance movement against the
37 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 10. Sumarsono was one of a handful of Indonesians who had 
received a Dutch education. Around 1937, the number of Indonesian children who were receiving a Dutch 
primary education was approximately 93,000 out of a population of 68 million. See David Steinberg, ed., In 
Search of Southeast Asia: ,4 Modern History (New York, NY: Praeger, 1971), p. 265. Between 1917 and 1942, 
the number of Indonesians who attended Dutch-medium schools was between 65,000 and 80,000, less than 
1 percent of the pertinent age group. In the final year of Dutch rule, fewer than 7,000 Indonesians were 
receiving Dutch secondary education. Most of them were enrolled in the MULO junior high schools. The 
figures are cited in Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 2-3.
38 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 10; Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 206.
39 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 12; Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 207. Although it remains unclear 
how Sumarsono obtained these materials, his (partial) reading list included Sukarno's "De Fikiran Rakjat"; 
Hatta's "Daulat Rakjat"; lectures by Roland Flolst and Rutgers; and Petrus Bloemberger's "National 
bewegingen in Indonesia."
40 Setiawan, Negara Madiun ?, p. 36.
41 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 12; Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 207. Gerindo was formed in 
Apri I 1937 by a group of young Marxist intellectuals. Amir Sjarifuddin, a founding member of Gerindo, 
was born in Medan, North Sumatra, on May 20,1907. Fie graduated from Europeesche Lagere School (ELS, 
European Primary School), and continued his education in the Netherlands. In 1933, he received a law 
degree in. Jakarta. During the Japanese Occupation, Sjarifuddin led Gerindo and was imprisoned for his 
underground resistance activities. During the revolution, he was a leader of the Socialist Party, along with 
Sjahrir, minister of defense from November 1945 to January 1948 and prime minister from July 1947 to 
January 1948. In February 1948, Sjarifuddin reformed the leftist coalition popularly known as the Sayap 
Kiri into Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR, People's Democratic Front), and in August he allied the FDR with 
Musso's PKI. Plis collaboration with the PKI proved fatal. Sjarifuddin was captured and executed by 
government forces in December 1948 for his involvement in the Madiun Affair. For Amir Sjarifuddin's 
biographical sketch, see Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 413-14; and Soerjono, "On Musso's 
Return," trans. Benedict Anderson, Indonesia 29 (April 1980): 61.
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Japanese and soon joined the Committee of the Younger Generation, an assembly of 
young activists in Surabaya.42 Also during his early days in Surabaya, he "masuk" 
(joined) the then-illegal and underground PKI. Although his affiliation with the party 
at this time appears to have been rather marginal (he would later recall that he was not 
aware of the identities of the party's top echelon, from whom he occasionally received 
"mandates"), he kept himself informed about the party's current platform and the 
agendas of leading advocates such as Amir Sjarifuddin, Musso, Alimin, and the future 
chairperson, Aidit, through its organ, Menara Merah (Red Tower).43
With the abrupt end of the Japanese Occupation, Indonesia declared independence 
on August 17, 1945, and soon faced the return of Dutch forces aiming to restore the 
prewar colonial order. Indonesia thereupon entered the four-year struggle for freedom 
known today as the National Revolution. As he was a man "obsessed with 
kemerdekaan" (freedom, independence), according to his own recollections, Sumarsono 
continued to take part in political movements throughout the revolutionary period.44 
Although he was neither a gifted spokesman nor a radical thinker, his active 
participation in the resistance movements during the prewar and wartime periods 
gradually brought him recognition as one of the important young political activists.45 
In the early months of the revolution, Sumarsono, still in his mid-twenties, began to 
play an important political role in Surabaya. On September 23,1945, he was selected as 
the first chairman of Pemuda Republik Indonesia (PRI, the Youth of the Indonesian 
Republic). During the time of turmoil around the outbreak of the Battle of Surabaya on 
November 10, 1945, the PRI under Sumarsono played a complementary role in 
establishing the municipal government through effective recruitment of members of 
the urban populace.46
In addition to acting as chairman of the PRI, Sumarsono participated in civilian and 
military affairs at the national level between 1945 and 1947. As a representative of the 
PRI, he attended the Kongres Pemuda (youth congress) held in Jakarta on November 
10 and 11, 1946. There, seven of the twenty-eight youth organizations present, 
including the PRI, formed Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Pesindo, Socialist Youth of 
Indonesia), and he was selected to be a co-chairperson of the new coalition, along with 
Wikana47and Chaerul Saleh.48 The same conference also made the decision to form
42 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 10; Frederick, Visions and Heat, p. 207. The Angkatan Muda 
Committee was formed sometime in March 1945. Roeslan Abdulgani, a native Surabayan and young 
intellectual, was selected by the pemuda circles to lead the new organization. Overall, the committee's 
leadership was in the hands of Dutch-educated political activists who were in their mid-to-late twenties 
and early thirties. Toward the end of the war, the Angkatan Muda Committee was engaged in various 
propaganda activities to concentrate popular efforts to achieve independence. Frederick, Visions and Heat, 
pp. 165-69.
43 Setiawan, Negara Madiun ?, pp. 41-44.
44 Ibid., p. 42.
45 Frederick, Visions and Heat, pp. 207-8.
46 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 10; Frederick, Visions and Heat, pp. 205-6.
Wikana was born into a noble Javanese family on October 19,1914, in Sumedang, West Java. After 
graduating from an ELS and a MULO, he joined the Gerindo and engaged in underground resistance 
activities during the war. After independence, he became a leader of Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (API, 
Indonesian Younger Generation) and later co-chaired the Pesindo after the API was fused into the Pesindo 
in November 1945. He was appointed the Youth Secretariat of Musso's PKI in August 1948. His life after 
Madiun is not well documented. He is said to have disappeared during the killings of 1965-66. Anderson,
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Badan Kongres Pemuda Republik Indonesia (BKPRI, Organization of the PRI 
Congress), a successor organization of the PRI, and Sumarsono was named its leader. 
After assuming the positions in the Pesindo and BKPRI, he moved to Madiun and 
made the town his home base until September 1948.48 9 A committed Pesindo leader, he 
stood by its policy lines through 1946 to 1947, and, in the process, became affiliated 
with the PKI. In December 1946, the Pesindo became one of the four organizations to 
form Sayap Kiri (Left Wing).50 In late February 1948, the Sayap Kiri was renamed FDR, 
which eventually absorbed the PKI in late August that year.
While leading the Pesindo and BKPRI, Sumarsono undertook multiple 
responsibilities in the national army and held the rank of major general. In February 
1946, he joined the education staff along with military leaders such as Sudirman and 
Tahi Bonar Simatupang in Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR, People's Security Army), a 
precursor to TNI formed in July 1947. Under the direction of Sjarifuddin, then the 
defense minister, members of the education staff were given the task of laying out the 
ideological foundation of the army because it was undergoing a transformation from 
an assembly of regional militias and armed units into a centrally orchestrated national 
army.51 President Sukarno also spearheaded the reform initiatives. In June 1946, 
Sukarno formed Dewan Pertahanan Negara (DPN, Council of National Defense), 
assuming the chairmanship himself, and appointed Sumarsono as Wakil Pemuda 
(Youth Representative) alongside representatives from religious groups and the rakyat 
(the people, loosely termed), as well as Sudirman, Ali Sastroamidjojo, and the leading 
cabinet members, including the ministers of defense, finance, and internal affairs.52 
Consequently, Sumarsono's participation in the ongoing military reorganization
Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 455-56; Soerjono, "On Musso's Return," p. 68; and Swift, Rond to Madiun, p. 
57.
48 Chaerul Saleh was born on September 13,1916, in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra. After graduating from an 
ELS and Hoogere Burger School (HBS, higher civil school), he became a leading student activist in the 
1930s and helped establish Perhimpunan Pelajar Indonesia (PPI, Indonesian Student Association). By the 
end of the war, he was known to be one of the notable radical and charismatic activists of his generation. 
Along with Wikana and others, Saleh planned the kidnapping of the preeminent nationalist leaders, 
Sukarno and Hatta, on August 16,1945, and demanded that the two announce the independence of 
Indonesia at once in defiance of the Japanese military, which was occupying Indonesia at the time. Saleh 
briefly held a chairmanship of the Pesindo in late 1945, and later joined Tan Malaka's Persatuan 
Perjuangan (PP, Struggle Union). Saleh was arrested by government forces in March 1946 because of the 
PP's opposition to the government and was imprisoned until August 1948. After August 1948, the 
government released Saleh at the same time as Tan Malaka and other members of the PP (probably hoping, 
it has been speculated, that they would undermine the PKI and FDR). Saleh was arrested again in 1966 for 
his support of the discredited Sukarno and died in jail sometime in 1967 or 1968. Anderson, Java in a Time 
of Revolution, p. 415; Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, pp. 26-27, 89, 92,139; and Soerjono, "On Musso's 
Return," p. 64.
49 Setiawan, Negara Madiun?, p. 84.
50 Sayap Kiri was a socialist coalition formed in September 1946; it consisted of Partai Sosialis (PS, Socialist 
Party), Partai Buruh Indonesia (PBI, Indonesian Labor Party), the Pesindo, and the PKI.
51 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 11; Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution, pp. 250-52; and 
Setiawan, Negara Madiun ?, pp. 84-87. Sumarsono became a member of Staf Pendidikan (Education Staff) 
within the TKR in February 1946 and was given the rank of major general in October 1946. The primary 
task of the education staff was to determine the ideological foundation of the army. The education staff 
consisted of six other appointees besides Sumarsono, all of whom represented either the Socialist Party or 
Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Masyumi, Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims).
52 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 11; Setiawan, Negara Madiun?, p. 85.
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brought him in close contact with national leaders, including Sukarno, with whom 
Sumarsono "met many times" upon commencing his DPN membership.53
Among these responsibilities, Sumarsono's leadership in BKPRI in Madiun marks 
one highlight in his early career and offers a rare insight into his role as a pemuda 
activist around the time of the Madiun Affair. As a spokesperson for the DPN, he 
actively engaged in public speaking at conferences and in radio broadcasts until the 
outbreak of the Madiun Affair. He routinely talked about the importance of "stirring 
up the spirit of the youth" (menggelorakan semangat pemuda) in the continued struggle 
against "the Dutch colonizer" (penjajah Belanda), a force that still occupied more than 
half of the Indonesian archipelago.54 5Unfortunately, most of the details of his speeches 
remain obscure because they were never recorded, or, if they were, they were lost or 
possibly destroyed. One exception is his speech at the third youth conference in 
Madiun on March 26, 1948. Entitled "Pergerakan Pemuda dan BKPRI Sepandjang 
Masa" and later published in Risalah Gerakan Pemuda, the speech outlined the 
organizational history of BKPRI since its inception in 1946 and called for support from 
"the revolutionary Workers and Farmers" (kaum Buruh/Tani jang revolusioner) in 
pursuit of "the struggle for democracy" (perdjoeangan demokrasi).55 Reflecting leftist and 
Marxist doctrines, Sumarsono identified the cause of "the Youth struggle" (perdjuangan 
Pemuda) with the aspiration of the masses, namely, workers and farmers. He stressed 
that the goal of the youth movement lay in the alleviation of their daily sufferings from 
the exploitation by "the bourgeoisie" (kaum bordjuis), who were harboring 
capitalism/imperialism, colonialism, and fascism."56 Although he stepped down from 
his BKPRI post shortly after the youth conference in 1948, he continued to advocate for 
the labor movement and was Wakil Ketua Serikat Buruh Minyak (the senior 
representative of the oil workers' union) at the time of the Madiun clash.57
The Setting
Just a few months after Sumarsono spoke eloquently about the democracy 
movement at the youth conference, he found himself in the midst of the event known 
today as Peristiiva Madiun. A sequence of developments in national politics in the first 
month of 1948 had particularly unsettling consequences and set the stage for this 
armed conflict nine months later. In January 1948, party leaders of the left-wing 
coalition cabinet under Amir Sjarifuddin were mired in the heated debate over 
whether to support the Renville Agreement, whose chief objective was to establish 
terms for a ceasefire between the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic.58 Republican
53 Setiawan, Negara Madiun?, p. 84.
54 Sumarsono's speech was transmitted via the Radio Republic Indonesia in Yogyakarta and via Gelora 
Pemuda, the radio station operated by BKPRI, in Madiun. Ibid., pp. 87-88.
55 Setiawan, Negara Madiun?, p. 88; Hardjito, Risalah Gerakan Pemuda (Jakarta: Pustaka Antara, 1952), p. 102.
56 Hardjito, Risalah Gerakan Pemuda, p. 112.
57 Setiawan, Negara Madiun?, p. 89.
58 The negotiations for the Renville Agreement were overseen by the United Nations Security Council and 
its mediating body, the Good Offices Committee (GOC), which consisted of five members who 
represented the Netherlands, Australia, Belgium, and the United States. Sjarifuddin's cabinet, formed in 
July 1947, represented all major (and often conflicting) political groups in the Indonesian Republic at the 
time, which included Sayap Kiri, Masyumi, and the PNI.
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leaders were faced with difficult choices. Accepting the armistice would ensure the 
continuation of Dutch sovereignty, whereas the refusal to sign the Renville 
Agreements would trigger an imminent Dutch attack. Meanwhile, the balance of 
power in the Sjarifuddin cabinet was crumbling from within. The Masyumi, the 
foremost opponent to the Renville accords, announced its withdrawal from the cabinet 
on January 15, while the PNI, another leading coalition party, retained its neutral 
stance. After abortive attempts to build a consensus in the cabinet, Sjarifuddin gave in 
and signed the Renville Agreements on January 17.
The decision to accept the Renville Agreements left a power vacuum in the 
government. The Masyumi wasted no time in using the agreements to discredit 
Sjarifuddin, and the PNI now abandoned the middle ground and announced its 
disapproval of the Renville terms. In the face of stiff opposition in the cabinet, 
Sjarifuddin stepped down as prime minister on January 23. His resignation effectively 
ended the succession of left-wing coalition cabinets that had been in place since 
November 1945. Fearful of a widening rift in the national leadership, President 
Sukarno stepped in to mend fences and appointed Vice President Mohammad Hatta as 
the new prime minister. The new cabinet under Hatta came into effect on January 31 
and was formed without the Sayap Kiri after negotiations to sustain a broad coalition 
ended without success.59 In a move that further dismayed members of Sayap Kiri, the 
Masyumi and the PNI, each of which had secured several spots in the cabinet, then 
quickly overturned their earlier opposition to Renville and declared their commitment 
to the terms of the Renville ceasefire. By the end of February, the government 
leadership was firmly in the hands of the Masyumi and the PNI, and Sayap Kiri was 
rapidly consolidating opposition forces under its new name, FDR.
The divisive course of events that disrupted Indonesian national politics in January 
and February 1948 takes center stage in all of Sumarsono's recollections. Sumarsono 
declares forcefully that the change of government and the subsequent removal of the 
FDR from the cabinet set the stage for the bloodshed in Madiun:
The original cause of the struggle between the FDR and the Hatta government lay 
in differences over the cabinet and its formation; its policies concerning the 
implementation of the Renville; and its internal politics, in particular, regarding 
the FDR. The FDR considered the formation of the Hatta cabinet to be completely 
unjust, its international politics tantamount to political capitulation; and its 
domestic policy, rather than supporting the FDR, was aimed at purging its 
elements.60
In his later account, he continues to discredit the government policies:
So apparently the Hatta cabinet was already prepared to replace the Amir 
cabinet, which was the one that had approved the Renville Agreement. 
Nevertheless, upon concluding the agreement, the [Amir] cabinet was denounced
59 The hopes for retaining the all-encompassing coalition were crushed when Hatta rejected Sjarifuddin's 
demand for a Sayap Kiri defense minister. Instead, Hatta opted to serve as both prime minister and 
defense minister himself. On the political maneuvering surrounding the formation of the Hatta cabinet, 
see Swift, Road to Madiun, pp. 17-21.
60 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," pp. 5-6. Excerpts of Sumarsono's accounts cited in this article have 
been translated by the author from the original Dutch and Indonesian texts.
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and collapsed. Then the Hatta cabinet was formed with former ministers of the 
Amir cabinet in order to implement the Renville Agreements! This is full of 
contradictions.61
Sumarsono's fierce repudiation of the Hatta government finds a parallel in Aidit's 1955 
court speech, "Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair":
In essence, the sixth Indonesian cabinet was a Masjumi cabinet led by Moh. Hatta. 
From the time of its formation on January 29, 1948, this cabinet pursued a 
completely Masjumi policy, and the Madiun Provocation was the most important 
implementation of this policy, i.e., the policy of rounding up and murdering 
Communists, the policy that the Masjumi leaders still pursue right up to this very 
day ... I declare that the Madiun Affair was a provocation of the government of 
Hatta, Sukiman, and Natsir.62
Upon withdrawal from national politics, the FDR immediately began to mobilize at 
various local sites with the intention of building opposition against the government. In 
his reports and interviews, Sumarsono refers extensively to the FDR's new strategies 
and subsequent demonstrations and mass meetings in Central and East Java. In doing 
so, he also illustrates the FDR's efforts to gain support from farmers and workers by 
advocating agrarian reform and organizing labor strikes. For instance, the labor strikes 
in Delanggu, a site in Central Java dominated by cotton plantations, in May to July 
1948, marked one of the highlights of the FDR's campaign against the Hatta 
government, and these strikes led to widespread protests by FDR supporters elsewhere 
in Central and East Java63:
The FDR went on to organize labor strikes. Strikes by plantation workers in 
Delanggu, petroleum workers in Cepu, SS workers in Purwodadi, Gundih, etc., 
made the atmosphere more troubled. This was especially true of the prolonged 
strikes in Delanggu, which were openly supported by all FDR organizations and 
led to sympathetic expressions, collection of stock shares, protests, 
demonstrations, and agitation. All workers and farmers throughout the Republic 
were influenced by workers' and farmers' organizations. Gradually the Delanggu 
strikes led to armed conflict, and clearly intensified the situation. The FDR did 
not diminish their agitation.64
As a result, the schism between the FDR and the government grew wider:
The struggle of the FDR against the Hatta government was mounted through the 
parliament as well as through outside agitation, precipitating the outbreak of 
mass protests, meetings, resolutions, and, later, strikes. This provoked armed 
incidents at the local level. The rationalization, confidential negotiations, and
1,1 Sumarsono, "Wawancara dengan Sumarsono," p. 93. In his 2008 interview with me, Sumarsono 
continued to speak of his disagreement with Hatta and about how his government was from the onset 
adamant about " membersihkan kiri" (purging the left).
62 The passage is taken from the English translation of Aidit's defense speech at the Jakarta district court in 
February 1955, "Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair," in The Selected Works ofD. N. Aidit, vol. I (Washington, 
DC: US Joint Publications Research Service, 1961), p. 260.
63 For a sociological study of the Delanggu strikes, see Sigit Wahyudi, Ketika Sarbupri Menggoncang Pabrik 
Karung Delanggu 1948: Sebuah Studi Awal Dari Pemberontakan PKI Madiun (Semarang: Bendara, 2001).
64 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 2
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intransigent policies of the Hatta government, which would not pass any 
proposal of the FDR, drove the FDR to resort to any means of opposition to 
dissolve the Hatta cabinet.65 The politics of both sides led to tensions among the 
masses, and the schism between the two could not be bridged.66
The strained relations between the FDR and the government led to a series of 
political murders and kidnappings in Solo, a city in Central Java more than fifty miles 
west of Madiun and a stronghold of the left-wing groups. These included the 
assassination of the commander of the Solo unit of TNI, Sutarto. Alarmed by the 
aggression of the government troops, particularly the Siliwangi Division of the TNI in 
Solo, Sumarsono anxiously observed how the volatile situation in Solo had spilled over 
to Madiun:67
Shortly after the murder of Sutarto, cases similar to the "Sutarto Affair" 
occurred.68 Seven members of the FDR in Solo, five of whom were active battalion 
commanders of the Brigade ALRI [Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia, Navy of 
the Republic of Indonesia] were kidnapped and disappeared without a trace. The 
FDR again suspected the Hatta government, which would have used the 
Siliwangi Division for the eradication and destruction of the FDR officials and 
FDR leaders. The FDR voiced its suspicions to its members ... Armed conflicts 
were unavoidable, and in Solo, after the case of Sutarto and the disappearance of 
others, a largescale armed conflict broke out [on] (September 14, 1948). Lt. Col. 
Suadi from the Sutarto division (Panembahan), supported by Jadoe from the 
ALRI, and Iskandar from the Brigade Bureau Perjuangan, took the initiative and 
launched attacks against the Siliwangi division, whose troops had been 
transported from Yogya. This violent confrontation was carried over to the 
Madiun Affair. These incidents in Solo alerted local troops in other regions to 
arm themselves. Troops and organizations that favored the Hatta government, as
65 The "rationalization" of the Indonesian National Army, which began in February 1948, was intended to 
reduce the size of the overextended and increasingly ineffective armed forces by demobilizing poorly 
equipped and trained troops. The majority of the disbanded units were based in central and eastern 
Javanese units that had been influenced by the FDR/PKI perspectives. The rationalization was often 
singled out as one of the root causes of the Madiun Affair because it fueled the perennial rivalry among 
the m i I i tary uni ts stemming from political disagreements intensified by differences in ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. See David Charles Anderson, "The Military Aspect of the Madiun Affair," Indonesia 21 
(April 1976): 53; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 261-66: and Swift, Road to Madiun, pp. 44-45.
00 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 6.
67Following the redrawing of territorial divisions under the Renville Agreements, the Siliwangi Division 
of the TNI was relocated from West Java to the Solo area, and West Java was occupied by the Netherlands. 
Siliwangi. soldiers, including its commander A. H. Nasution, were known for their loyal support for the 
Hatta government. The role played by the events in Solo and their significance in provoking the outbreak 
of the Madiun Affair has been discussed extensively in major works on the Madiun Affair. In The Road to 
Madiun, Ann Swift writes that the circumstances in Solo "provided the spark which was to set off the 
revolt in Madiun one week later" (p. 67). Likewise, Reid refers to the mounting tension between the 
government troops—namely the Siliwangi division and its FDR counterparts—as the prelude to the 
conflict in Madiun in September. Reid, Indonesian Revolution, p. 136. See also Kahin, Nationalism and 
Revolution, pp. 261-66.
65 At the ti me of his murder, Sutarto was the commander of the Solo division of the Indonesian Army 
known as Divisi IV-Senopati. Many of his units were formed by pro-FDR soldiers from ALRI (Angkatan 
Laut Republik Indonesia, Navy of the Republic of Indonesia) and the Pesindo. Sumarsono recalls Sutarto 
as a follower of Alimin and a critic of the Hatta cabinet ("De Madioen Affaire," p. 3). It is therefore not 
surprising that Sutarto's allegiance to the government was often in question because of his radicalism and 
his popularity in the FDR. Swift, Road to Madiun, pp. 14, 46—47.
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well as those that stood with the FDR side [began to arm themselves], foreseeing 
clashes in their areas. The situation was extremely critical!69
In the transcript of his 1998 interview, Sumarsono once again recalls how the mounting 
tension in Solo kept the pro-FDR troops in Madiun staying on guard, and he asserts 
that the Hatta government was the mastermind of the disorder in the city:
I visited Muso and Amir Sjarifuddin in Kediri. There I was told about the 
problem of kidnapping and fighting in Solo, the battle had already flared up in 
Solo, and the commander of Sutarto Division was terrified. Then, some 
commanders were kidnapped. At least eight people were kidnapped and 
apparently were later seen in Srambatan, where Siliwangi troops were stationed. 
Then these commanders were taken to Wirogunan, a state prison. They were 
kidnapped and thrown into the state prison in Wirogunan. So I could only 
conclude that the root cause of this kidnapping was government policy! Then, 
kidnapping also occurred in Madiun. This implies that the same measures used 
in Solo were going to be used against the leftists, the FDR supporters in Madiun.70
While the Solo affairs were symptomatic of what was to take place in Madiun a few 
days later, it was a series of disturbances in Madiun that culminated in the final 
collision on September 18.71 Speaking from the vantage point of an eyewitness who 
had been based in the city since late 1945, Sumarsono gives a firsthand account of how 
the growing disorder accelerated the FDR's move toward armed resolution:
The murder of Sutarto, the disappearance of seven FDR members and later of 
five battalion commanders in Solo, and the battle in Solo, created a volatile 
atmosphere surrounding the Madiun FDR. When the FDR in Solo called for 
assistance from the Madiun FDR, the whole Madiun area was full of the 
provocative pamphlets from Solo and tension quickly increased ... In the 
meantime, Madiun municipal workers were on strike, demanding a pay raise. 
The Military Police Corps [Corps Polisi Militer, CPM] could not tolerate this 
strike, and tried to force the strikers to work, but the workers stood their 
ground.72... These actions soon brought the CPM into collision with the TNI units 
that stood for the workers and the FDR. The situation came close to direct 
military action. It was hard for either side to show restraint. The strike went 
forward ... The FDR troops, witnessing these developments with their own eyes, 
became alarmed and called for the Madiun FDR to move to the attack. Conditions 
had reached the critical point.73
69 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 3.
70 Sumarsono, "Wawancara dengan Sumarsono," pp. 84-85.
71 In contrast, the existing literature makes little or no reference to the disorder in Madiun and tends to 
suggest that the Solo affairs alone prompted Sumarsono and his fellow Pesindo officers to take 
preventative measures against the government troops in Madiun. See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 
290; Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, pp. 141-42; and Swift, Road to Madiun, p. 72. Two exceptions in 
this respect are Pinardi's Peristiwa Coup Berdarah PKI (pp. 77-79) and Aidit's Aidit Menggugat Peristiwa 
Madiun (pp. 25-29).
77 The CPM was a close ally of the government and was then headed by Gatot Subroto, a former officer of 
the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL, Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger) who had been recently 
appointed by Sukarno as the new military governor of Solo to restore order.
73 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 4.
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In transcripts of his 1998 and 2000 interviews, Sumarsono once again recalls the 
simmering tension in Madiun following the clash in Solo. He reiterates that the 
kidnapping of union leaders by the pasukan gelap (mysterious troops) fueled the 
frustration among the pro-FDR officers in the TNI. His reference to the pasukan gelap is 
noteworthy because it obscures the identity of the aggressors, the CPM, which he 
identified in his earlier report, in 1949:74
At that time, the Sebda [and its] state-employed workers were on strike. They 
were making socioeconomic demands, but all of a sudden three union leaders 
were kidnapped by the pasukan gelap ... Since we had already asked Territorial 
Commander Lieut. Col. Sumantri [about the kidnappings], who responded he 
knew nothing, our officers were infuriated [by his response]. "If that is the case, it 
must be the mysterious troops, and they need to be removed." In this way, the 
officers from the Brigade 29 troops became frustrated with the situation, in which 
strikers were kidnapped, which was unprecedented in Madiun. These officers 
were former Pesindo.75
The Beginning of the Madiun Affair
Having witnessed the offensive actions carried out by the CPM (or the pasukan 
gelap, according to the later accounts) in Madiun, Sumarsono consulted with FDR 
leaders in Kediri, a city located more than thirty-five miles east of Madiun. There he 
received instructions to demobilize the instigators of the turmoil in Madiun to avoid 
further bloodshed in the area. While describing the executive decision to disarm the 
agitators in Madiun as a preemptive action, his 1949 account further clarifies that this 
action specifically targeted "the CPM, the Police, and the Siliwangi units":
In the very tense situation discussed above (violent clashes in Solo, strikes in 
Madiun, etc. ... ), the Madiun FDR board members sent me out to Kediri as 
chairman of the Madiun FDR Action Committee [Komite van Aksi Madiun FDR] 
to meet the FDR executive committee [members] who were on tour there. I was to 
deliver a report about the very critical situation in Madiun and ask for further 
instructions from the executive committee on how the Madiun FDR should deal 
with these things ... The FDR executive committee (Muso, Amir, Setijadjit, 
Wikana, Harjono) decided that the Madiun FDR should disarm the Military 
Police Corps [CPM], the Police, and the Siliwangi units who took violent action 
against the workers on strike, before the FDR itself was disarmed. The Madiun 
FDR Action Committee had to lead these disarmament efforts in order to get 
people to support the FDR.76
74 Sumarsono refers to the pasukan gelap liberally in all his recollections recorded since the late 1990s.
75 Sumarsono, "Wawancara dengan Sumarsono," p. 95. Brigade 29 consisted of six battalions of mostly 
PKI/ Pesindo troops under the command of Colonel Dachlan and was stationed in the Madiun area at the 
time. It was part of East Java Division VI of the TNI under Sungkono, who, like Sutarto, was a commander, 
who had grown up in the area, whose loyalty to the central government was often questioned. Like 
Sutarto's Division IV in Solo, Division VI was composed largely of pro-FDR troops.
76 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 4.
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Upon return from Kediri, Sumarsono met with "the administrators of the Madiun FDR 
and the Committee of Action," and, together, they fixed "the time of action" to execute 
the instructions:
After I returned from Kediri with the executive committee's instructions, I met 
with the administrators of the Madiun FDR and the Committee of Action, and we 
decided to carry out the instructions. The military committee of Madiun FDR 
discussed the technical implementation, and the time of action was fixed ... The 
action took place the night of September 18-19, 1948. There was violence from 
both sides, but it lasted only until the following morning, when the Military 
Police Corps [Corps Polisi Militair, CPM], the Police, and the Siliwangi units 
surrendered and were disarmed by the FDR troops. The disarmament spread to 
local parts of the residency.77
Sumarsono's later accounts confirm that the Madiun Affair began as "a regular 
clash" between the Pesindo-led Brigade 29 and the pasukan gelap, the suspected 
kidnappers of labor activists, with the goal of disarming the latter. 8 Although the 
overall outline of the event remains unchanged compared with the 1949 report, in a 
later interview Sumarsono elaborates on his explanation and adds that the incident on 
September 18 was an act of self-defense on the part of the FDR troops:
The truth is—speaking as an eyewitness to the Madiun Affair—it was a regular 
clash among the TNI troops—between the TNI and the police, since Brigade 29 
was part of the TNI. At that time, Brigade 29 took action against the pasukan gelap 
that had been stationed in Madiun ... I believe they are the ones who kidnapped 
workers who had organized a strike. There indeed was a strike by the Sebda in 
Madiun, and its leaders were kidnapped by unknown troops. These incidents led 
Brigade 29, the troops that had been stationed in Madiun, to take action. So, what 
happened then was just an ordinary clash ... It is indeed correct to say that the 
background of Madiun had to do with self-defense, to defend [ourselves] by 
establishing a national front government in the Madiun area.79
Sumarsono further justifies the pressing need for "self-defense" in his response to the 
interviewer's question about whether there was any "enthusiasm for opposing the 
central government":
No, there wasn't. There was only an enthusiasm for self-defense, because all the 
troops were loyal to the central government. The government ordered the attack 
on us. At that time we were facing a very difficult situation. Troops from Brigade 
29, the largest one, consisting of only four battalions, were encircled and attacked 
from all directions, and were pushed into a corner. We took action just for self- 
defense.80
77 Ibid., p. 5.
78 Although the identity of the "paskan gelap" is undisclosed in the abovementioned quote, in a few 
passages later he speculates, "The police and the CPM" were involved in these incidents, thus they were to 
be disbanded by Brigade 29 (Berbagai Fakta, pp. 86-7). His recollection here is slightly more fragmented 
than the 1949 counterpart. The Siliwangi troops, which he previously mentioned as being responsible for 
the kidnappings, are notably absent.
79 Sumarsono, "Wawancara dengan Sumarsono," pp. 83-84.
80 Ibid., p. 87.
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He then refers back to the aforementioned meeting with the FDR leaders in Kediri on 
the eve of the military action, and stresses that initiating the Madiun Affair was not his 
independent act:
Some speculated that the affair was of my doing. This is not correct. I reported to 
Kediri and I returned to Madiun in the middle of the night ... It was I who 
reported [the event in Madiun] to Pak Muso and Amir Sjarifuddin as the FDR 
leaders. They were the leaders of the new movement for fusion. They responded: 
"Take action." ... I reported the presence of the mysterious troops. So there was 
no intention to establish a government, not at all. It was just about the problem of 
kidnapping, and our need to defend ourselves. That was it.81
When read together, Sumarsono's testimonies about the instructions he received 
from the FDR/PKI leaders present discrepancies with the existing literature. Most 
renditions indicate that starting the Madiun Affair was Sumarsono's own act and do 
not mention that the FDR/PKI leaders directed Sumarsono to resist and disarm those 
who had attacked their allies and, therefore, these leaders knew about the military 
action that would erupt on September 18. For instance, the PKI's standard text on 
Madiun by the party chairperson, Aidit, dissociates the party from the incident on 
September 18:
In order to make it even clearer that the PKI and the FDR had no plans to carry 
out a seizure of power in Madiun, I must state that at the time the fighting and 
disarmament were going on in the army, Comrades Musso, Amir Sjarifuddin, 
Harjono, and others were not in Madiun. Just at that time, Comrade Musso, 
together with a party of persons, was on a tour on behalf of the PKI, and they 
were then in Purwodadi. Comrade Musso and his group only arrived in Madiun 
at midnight on September 18th. He came at the request of the FDR leadership in 
Madiun because of the tense situation.82
According to well-known analysts of these events, if the FDR/PKI leadership had any 
role in instigating the bloodshed in Madiun, it would have been part of their larger 
plan to carry out an armed takeover to be launched sometime in late 1948—the 
blueprint that likely prompted Sumarsono and his comrades to start the military 
action.83 For instance, in Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, George Kahin describes 
the onset of the affair as follows:
Events in Surakarta were undoubtedly making the Pesindo leaders at that 
organization's headquarters in Madiun increasingly uneasy ... For the top 
Pesindo leaders, who had already defied the government's demobilization 
orders, it must have appeared that the die had been cast and that they now had 
only two alternatives, (1) to submit to the government's demobilization order and 
thereby give up their own personal positions of power as well as a major source 
of the revolutionary military potential of the new PKI, or (2) to take the initiative 
themselves and embark upon the revolutionary phase of the PKI's strategy ... It
81 Ibid., p. 96.
82 Aidit, "Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair," pp. 265-66.
83 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 291-92; Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I., p. 79; Reid, 
Indonesian National Revolution, p. 142; Soetanto, Perintah Presiden Soekarno, p. 147; and Swift, Road to Madiun, 
p. 74.
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was the later course which Sumarsono and the top Pesindo leaders in the Madiun 
area chose. The local pro-PKI officers of the regular TNI units stationed in the 
eastern part of the Republican-controlled area apparently decided likewise, and 
such officers as Colonel Djokosujono, Lt. Col. Dahlan, and Lt. Col. Sumantri 
joined with the Pesindo leaders. On their own, without the consent or knowledge 
of the top leadership of the PKI, they formally launched a revolution against the 
government of the Republic.84
Footsteps after Madiun
In the wake of the Madiun Affair, Sumarsono assumed the post of military 
governor of the National Front Government, a provisional government for the Madiun 
area, and took part in outlining its fundamental political and social policies.85 
However, the government launched a military campaign to quell the rebellion, 
following President Sukarno's declaration on September 19 that the Madiun Affair was 
a coup attempt, directed against the Indonesian Republic, and the result of a 
conspiracy by Musso's PKI. Republican forces succeeded in capturing Madiun on 
September 30, so none of Sumarsono's executive decisions was put into practice.86 
Sometime around the time of the takeover, Sumarsono, along with eight companies of 
soldiers, left the city and headed north into the Dutch territory to escape persecution. 
After being on the run for two months, they were arrested by Dutch troops in the 
Demak area in Central Java and charged with "illegal possession of gold and 
treasury."87 Sumarsono was tried at the Dutch military court in Semarang and 
sentenced to nine months in prison. Although the Dutch authorities were suspicious 
that he had been involved in the Madiun Affair, he managed to deceive them by 
adopting a false identity through forgery.88 89
Following his release on July 30, 1949, Sumarsono fled to Jakarta, where he was 
captured again by the Dutch on October 29, 1949, and taken to the Sipayar prison. This 
time, he was charged with the identity fraud he had committed during the previous 
imprisonment to avoid a trial for his involvement in the Madiun Affair.sg Not 
surprisingly, the Dutch authorities, from the onset, focused on discovering his part in 
the incident. The outcome of the investigation was compiled in "De Madioen Affaire," 
dated and signed on November 11, 1949. Effectively disclosing the suspect's 
involvement, the report concluded that Sumarsono was a subversive figure who staged 
the Madiun revolt and should therefore be banished to New Guinea for eventual 
execution. When Sumarsono learned about his sentence through his wife, he escaped 
from the prison on December 13, 1949. He thereafter went to Pematang Siantar in
84 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 290.
85 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," pp. 7-9; Pinardi, Peristiwa Coup Berdarah P.K.I., p. 80; and Soe Hok 
Gie, Orang-orang di Persimpangan Kiri jalan, p. 236.
86 Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 200; Nasution, Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan, p. 376; Soetanto, Perintah 
Presiden Soekarno, p. 194; and Swift, Road to Madiun, pp. 75-76, 98-99, Appendix B.
87 Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," pp. 9-10,13; and Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbagai Fakta dan Kesaksian, 
pp. 89-90.
88 Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbagai Fakta dan Kesaksian, p. 90.
89 Ibid., pp. 90,104; Sumarsono, "De Madioen Affaire," p. 14.
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North Sumatra, where he stayed for fourteen years and lived as a teacher, maintaining 
a low political profile.90 His association with Madiun, nonetheless, left an indelible 
mark on his life. In 1965, at the height of the anti-Communist campaign that swept 
across Indonesia, he was arrested again, this time by the Indonesian government under 
Suharto, for his suspected connection with the PKI, and he spent the next decade in 
prison. Soon after his release, he left Indonesia for Australia with his wife. Now in his 
late eighties, he currently resides in Jakarta and Sydney.
Personal Narratives, Political Transitions, and Historiography
In the historiography of the Madiun Affair, the political orientation of the authors 
and the spokespeople has played a conspicuous role in interpreting which actors were 
accountable for the event that reportedly claimed the lives of so many. Sympathizers of 
the Republican government called it a pemberontakan (rebellion) or "coup" instigated by 
the PKI, whereas the PKI supporters maintained that it was a provokasi (provocation) 
staged by the Republican government to drive out the leftist elements in political and 
military organizations. Although Sumarsono's political profile at the time of the 
Madiun Affair was unmistakably leftist in outlook, a focused reading of his accounts 
brings to the fore complex ways in which his political affiliation played out in the 
shaping of his narratives. Sumarsono clarifies in all of his accounts that, in taking part 
in the incident, he was only following instructions from the PKI leaders and did not 
play a leading role in initiating the armed resistance against the government forces. His 
consistent claims defending his innocence and describing the direct instructions he 
received from the PKI leaders are at odds with most versions of the events, which 
underscore his independent decision to pull the trigger or, alternately, vehemently 
deny the PKI's involvement.91 As such, Sumarsono's narratives do not fall conveniently 
into either side of the partisan debate over who was accountable for this violent clash. 
Moreover, the conflicting accounts offered by Sumarsono and the PKI concerning the 
words and deeds of the party leaders on the eve of September 18 raise further 
questions about whether Sumarsono's political affiliation has had any substantive 
influence on the storyline of his narratives. Although the current efforts of the 
Indonesian left to rewrite the history of the Madiun Affair from their standpoint 
brought Sumarsono into the public spotlight, his narratives are not measurably 
influenced by partisan loyalty, and they remind us that the resurgent "counter" 
narrative of the PKI is not channeled through a single voice.
When read comparatively alongside other reports of these same events, 
Sumarsono's accounts illuminate the vantage point of a survivor who lived through 
several regimes and had a chance to discuss his experience on multiple occasions.92
90 Penerbit Pustaka Pena, Berbagai Fakta dim Kesaksian, pp. 90-91,105-6.
91 D. N. Aidit, "Aidit Accuses the Madiun Affair," pp. 260-66; Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 290; 
Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 142; Swift, Road to Madiun, p. 90; and Soetanto, Perintah Presiden 
Soekarno, "Rebut Kembali Madiun . . . ," p. 144.
92 In "Between History and Memory," James E. Young characterizes survivor's memory as follows: "How 
the survivor has organized this story reveals a kind of understanding unique to someone who has known 
events both directly and at some remove. The survivor's memory includes both experiences of history and 
memory: the ways memory has already become part of personal history, the ways misapprehension of 
events and the silences that come with incomprehension were part of events as they unfolded then and 
part of memory as it unfolds now." Young, "Between History and Memory," p. 53.
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Parts of a rare collection of personal narratives spanning six decades, each of his 
accounts is a product of the circumstance in which it was produced. For instance, "De 
Madioen Affaire" was composed during his detention in Dutch prison, with 
Sumarsono typing out his Dutch testimony while under surveillance by two Dutch 
interrogators.93 Faced with the impending criminal charge, he remained somber in his 
tone of speech and described the political background to the Madiun Affair to defend 
himself against charges based on of his alleged involvement. In contrast, his recent 
accounts, produced more than five decades later, are informal and spontaneous 
dialogues between the older Sumarsono and the interviewers, and in these he spoke 
openly, and at relative ease, about a number of issues ranging from the justification for 
his actions to his acquaintance with political leaders, including Sukarno, Hatta, and 
Suharto.
A careful reading of Sumarsono's narratives shows how the passage of time has 
played out in altering the depth and breadth of his memory.94 Since his early account, 
"De Madioen Affaire," was recorded just a year after the incident, it offers the most 
extensive account of the course of events in Madiun and identifies the forces behind 
the chaos in the city in greater detail than any later recollection. Only in the 1949 
statement does Sumarsono identify three parties—the CPM, the police, and the 
Siliwangi division—as the perpetrators who organized the kidnapping of striking 
workers and who therefore became the immediate targets of the FDR forces' 
disarmament efforts on September 18. The meticulous account of the progress on the 
ground is less evident in later accounts, in which Sumarsono commonly encodes the 
suspected perpetrators with the phrase pasukan gelap. The ever-present "mysterious 
troops" in his recent recollections bolster his interpretation of the Madiun Affair as an 
unavoidable result of an act of "self-defense" on the part of the FDR, against the 
aggressors. This self-defense thesis is a provocative justification of his act that does not 
appear in the largely descriptive 1949 statement.
However accurate, representative, or partial Sumarsono's narratives may be, his 
continued assertion of his innocence in initiating the Madiun Affair speaks for its 
honesty and deserves scholarly attention. This article acknowledges and seeks to 
illuminate his "distinctive positioning" as a surviving eyewitness to the Madiun 
Affair.95
93 Personal communication with Sumarsono on June 2, 2008.
94 His growing temporal distance from the event has given Sumarsono a holistic view of world affairs that 
provides a context through which he interprets his own political career. For instance, in the 2008 
interviews with me, Sumarsono shared his view on the changing relations of power in international 
politics. Having observed the growing dominance of the United States in world politics in the second half 
of the twentieth century, Sumarsono maintained that Indonesia had yet to attain merdeka because it was 
stymied by US neo-imperialism. Sumarsono may no longer be fighting physically for freedom and 
independence, as he did in his youth, but his words speak firmly for his continued commitment to 
national causes. At various points in the interviews, he stressed his continued support for Pancasila (five 
principles), which he sees as the philosophical pillar of the Indonesian state. Alongside Pancnsiln, his 
political worldview revolves around his continued admiration for Sukarno and his Nasakom (Nationalism, 
Religion, and Communism) doctrine, as well as the Sanmin zhuyi, or Three Principles, espousing 
nationalism, democracy, and socialism. Personal communication with Sumarsono on June 2-3, 2008.
95 Waterson, Southeast Asian Lives, p. 14.
